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ABSTRACT 
Introductory programming courses are known worldwide to pose challenges for both students and educators. A recent 
meta-review of research in the area has indicated something in the order of a sixty six percent pass rate globally. Yet the 
New Zealand Government has asked institutions to set high and increasing targets as a goal for student pass rates in its 
educational performance indicators. Increasingly these metrics are being used to shape the behaviour and educational 
outcomes sought from educational institutions, with the threat of penalties by way of loss of funding for supposedly 
“poorly performing courses”. Yet while focused at the institutional level, how do these indicators really meet the needs of 
all the stakeholders in the tertiary education system? To what extent do they distort and create incentives for perverse 
behaviours? This review assesses the dilemmas such measurement systems pose to educators using the case of 
introductory programming as an example.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The large body of research on introductory programming 
courses indicates that the subject poses challenges for both 
students and educators. A recent meta-review of the global 
literature (Watson & Li, 2014), records that typically some 
two thirds of students tend to pass the introductory course. 
Yet the New Zealand Government has embarked on a process 
of progressively raising the expectations of educational 
performance asking institutions to set high targets (one 
example is 85%) of students passing their courses and 
increasing the target in subsequent years. Under this 
educational performance indicator (EPI) based regime, 
institutions that fail to meet these targets run the risk of 
having their courses defunded. So how are such targets set 
and how do they impact the stakeholders in tertiary 
education? Does a solely institutional focus result in better 
educational performance or does it merely generate perverse 
incentives and skew outcomes to the detriment of other 
stakeholder groups such as employers? This paper reviews the 
dilemmas facing educators in computing in adapting to an EPI 
driven regime, taking the introductory programming course as 
an illustrative case. 
2. EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
INDICATORS 
2.1 What are EPI’s? 
The Education Performance Indicators: Definition and 
Methodology document published by the New Zealand 
Tertiary Education Commission defines educational 
performance as the: 
Activities TEOs undertake that contribute to the 
Government’s vision for the tertiary education system: 
this requires tertiary education to ‘better equip individuals 
with the skills and qualifications needed to participate 
effectively in the labour market and in an innovative and 
successful New Zealand’.” (TEC 2014, p.1) 
Educational performance is measured by a set of indicators 
which include: 
The standard internationally recognised measures of 
student achievement are those relating to student 
retention, progression, and completion of courses and 
qualifications. In line with these standard measures, we 
have developed definitions (specifically ‘formulae’) for a 
core set of performance indicators that measure TEOs’ 
educational performance through the progression, 
retention, and completion achievements of their students.” 
(TEC, 2014, p.2) 
The four indicators are as follows:  
 Successful course completion is measured by the EFTS-
weighted successful course completion rate. This is the 
successfully completed enrolments in courses at a TEO 
each year, as a proportion of the total enrolments in 
courses, weighted by the EFTS value of the enrolments.  
 Student retention is measured by the student completion 
(or continuation) rate. This is the number of re-
enrolments or qualification completions at a TEO each 
year compared with the number of students present at the 
TEO in the previous year.  
 Qualification completion is measured by the EFTS-
weighted qualification completion rate. This is the 
number of qualifications completed at a TEO each year 
(weighted by the EFTS value of each qualification), as a 
proportion of the total enrolments in qualifications in that 
year (weighted by the EFTS value of the enrolments).  
 Student progression is measured by the completion 
progression rate. This is a rate of re-enrolment in a 
higher-level qualification in the following year for 
students who have completed a qualification.” (TEC, 
2014, p.2) 
(note: 1 EFTS is an Effective Full-time Student) 
2.2 The Context 
The current government strategy for controlling expenditure 
in the big spending departments (health, education, 
corrections, social welfare), has been outlined as setting 
“some very specific measurable service targets…[e.g.] 
increase the proportion of 19 year olds with NCEA level 2 or 
equivalent to 85% by 2017” (Roughan, Weekend Herald, 
This quality assured paper appeared at ITX 2014, incorporating the 5th annual 
conference of Computing and Information Technology Research and Education 
New Zealand (CITRENZ2014) and the 27th Annual Conference of the National 
Advisory Committee on Computing Qualifications, Auckland, New Zealand, 
October 8-10, 2014. Mike Lopez and Michael Verhaart, (Eds). 
July12, p. A23). This approach would also appeal to the 
business led council of the Tertiary Education Commission 
(TEC) as akin to the business approach of adopting Key 
Performance Indicators or KPIs to measure business 
performance. It is worthy of note that of the seven TEC 
commissioners only one has any tertiary education sector 
experience1 . One could form the view that in the absence of 
knowledge of how tertiary education actually works, 
borrowing some simplistic business management and 
measurement approaches might have appeal to the 
commissioners.  
However, ensuring that the measures adopted do not have the 
counter effect of reducing the desired performance is a more 
complex task. Note for instance in the school system the 
commentary by Holt (2001) observing that there are pitfalls 
in: 
…Conventional programmes designed for students who 
are identified as ‘at risk’ [described as]…less challenging 
and more repetitive, with the teacher breaking down each 
task into small pieces, working through procedures step 
by step and leaving little opportunity for higher order 
thinking… 
This culture of managerial oversight is problematic as 
Pritchard (2012, p. 19) has observed  
…the dominant managerialist culture within tertiary 
education runs counter to the traditional culture of 
teaching. Managerialism with its emphasis on efficiency 
and external accountability treats teachers as functionists 
rather than professionals and thereby diminishes their 
autonomy and commitment to the values and principles of 
education (Codd, 2005, xv)  
He suggests that this situation leads to a culture of 
performativity in which ends are separate from means and 
people are valued by what they produce (Codd, p. xv).  
Pritchard (2012, p. 22) cites Baldwin & James (2002) in 
identifying the complexity of tertiary learning and teaching, 
and its “tangible non observable qualities”: 
The outcomes of tertiary courses are much harder to 
assess and compare than say the holding properties of two 
forms of glue. They are complex and long term and many 
are hard to measure precisely 
So in the absence of the ability to actually measure learning 
we end up with flawed proxies that are easy to measure. 
2.3 How are the EPI targets set? 
The New Zealand Tertiary Education Strategy (TES) 2014 - 
2019 sets out the Government's long-term strategic direction 
for tertiary education; and its current and medium-term 
priorities for tertiary education. The TEC use this strategy to 
set performance indicators for the sector. Tertiary institutions 
are required to complete a three yearly investment plan for 
approval, where they set the performance indicators for the 
three year period. These are set by the institution and 
negotiated with the TEC. The tertiary institutions would 
appear to set these EPI’s either as an increase on previous 
years achievements or take the median in their sector as the 
indicator. Thus the measures have a normative effect across 
sectors.  
The tertiary institutions are required to report on all four 
education performance indicators in their Annual Reports 
measuring them against previous years and some have 
                                                                
1 http://www.tec.govt.nz/About-us/Who-we-are/Board-of-
Commissioners/ 
measured the performance against other similar institutions in 
the sector. 
Institutions course completion targets have been increasing 
over the past five years, for example in the Institute of 
Technology and Polytechnic sector, one institution’s overall 
course completion targets were reported as: 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
67% 75% 77% 79% 79% 
 
While a similar institution reported targets as: 
2007 2010 2011 
74% 81% 85% 
 
The university sector report similar actual results and 
evidence of increasing targets, including all students, student 
achievement component (SAC) or publicly funded and 
international full fee paying. 
2010 
Actual 
2011 
Actual 
2012 
Forecast 
2013 
Target 
2014 
Target 
2015 
Target 
78% 79% 81% 81-82% 81-83% 82-84% 
Massey University Investment Plan 2013 – 2015 (2012) 
This reporting then begs the question: are these targets really 
of value as the course completions are averaged out over all 
disciplines at all levels. Will students really choose their place 
of study based on such ambiguous and homogenised 
information. Yet this is one of the main reasons TEC required 
institutions to report this annually (TEC, 2014). Without all 
the other factors this information is extremely misleading. 
2.4 DO EPI’S MEASURE QUALITY? 
The TEC assert that:  
TEC’s funding is linked to educational performance, and 
information on the educational performance of all TEOs is 
published annually. Making information such as 
completion and retention rates public strengthens the 
accountability of TEOs and better informs students and 
employers when they are making choices about tertiary 
education. (TEC, 2014. p.1)  
These goals then demonstrate the prevalent ideological 
‘consumerist’ perspective on education. 
In the discourse of enterprise humans are defined in a 
wholly economic frame, with individual lives as an 
enterprise of the self, like individual businesses engaged 
in developing their own human capital. The language of 
the market takes over, and civic culture becomes 
consumer culture. The citizen is reconceptualized as the 
sovereign consumer/customer. This discourse, for some 
time popular with western governments, has now 
permeated into the areas of social service provision. 
Patients, parents, passengers and pupils are re-imaged as 
customers. (Du Gay & Salaman, 1992)  
So the notion of quality espoused here seems to be quality of 
the information made available to assist the ‘student as 
consumer’ choice? Whether the needs of the ‘employer as 
consumer’ are met by these EPIs is a moot point, especially if 
institutions’ aims become distorted to reach EPI target 
completions rather than educational outcomes.  
Other models of quality could be considered, e.g. educational 
quality as ‘production’ in delivery of the curriculum; 
education quality as delivering a ‘service’ to the student; and 
educational quality as ‘development’ of the student (Pears, 
2010). The model of educational quality that we prefer 
reflects the latter conception, and is that advocated by Corder, 
Horsburgh and Melrose, (1999) in which ‘transformation of 
the student’ through the educational experience is the goal.  
The EPI approach relies solely on the education as consumer 
service model, and so marginalises other and truer, or at the 
very least complementary, measures of educational quality.  
2.5 University reaction 
In comment from the University of Auckland and Massey 
University the crude nature of the EPI’s as a measure of 
quality has been critiqued. Vice Chancellor McCutcheon of 
the University of Auckland questions the validity of the data:  
The fundamental problem is that the TEC uses unadjusted 
institutional average performance measures in its 
presentation. In reality, the performance measures are 
influenced by a great many factors, including the socio-
economic backgrounds of the institution’s students, 
student ethnicity, part-time versus full-time status, subject 
area and whether the students are internal or extramural. 
(University of Auckland, 2014) 
 He goes on to comment on the interpretation of the results  
A second issue is that, even if they were robust, the data 
would be difficult to interpret. For example, is a high 
course completion rate a good thing because it reflects an 
institution that has excellent teaching and a high level of 
student support, or a bad thing because it reflects an 
institution that has low standards and makes it easy for 
students to pass? (ibid) 
Massey University Assistant Vice-Chancellor Cas Carter says 
the measures do not take into account the student profile of a 
university such as Massey.  
While we understand the Tertiary Education 
Commission’s requirements for performance data, neither 
the data set, nor the method of measurement, provides any 
indicator of quality. (Massey University, 2010) 
3. INTRODUCTORY PROGRAMMING 
Taking the introductory programming course as an illustrative 
case for our argument, how do we set valid and pedagogically 
legitimate expectations for our students? For a variety of 
reasons introductory programming is known as a challenging 
course and there is a global literature associated with these 
challenges, as observed in the quote below:  
Learning to program can be an incredibly difficult task, to 
the point where the phrases “failure rate" and 
“programming course" are almost synonymous (Watson 
& Li, 2014) 
To put this challenge for computing educators in the global 
context, a tabulation of failure rates in introductory 
programming by country, based on studies in the literature, 
reports a range from 60+ percent to 5% (Watson & Li, 2014 
figure 1 below). Why is this variation so great and what 
methodology might be suitable for developing an appropriate 
indicator for success? (Even assuming that any form of EPI 
were warranted). 
Watson & Li (2014) concluded that a 66% pass rate for 
introductory programming, was the mean in their selection of 
globally published studies. So would there be any logic in 
setting that figure as a target? For instance how representative 
of typical courses and institutions were these studies? Did 
they perhaps over-represent the typical pass rates as other 
studies may have been too embarrassed to report results? 
Watson & Li’s results left unclear the “individual breakdowns 
on the failure and withdraw rates of courses” (2014), so the 
comparability of these figures with TEC’s EPI’s for course 
completions (which do include withdrawals and non-
completions) is not clear. It is possible that this could account 
for a further 10% of students, which would then result in 
equivalent mean pass rates of 56% applying the TEC formula. 
(A figure which it should be noted is below TEC’s latest 
threshold level of 60% at which a course is relegated into the 
category of “low performing provision”). Yet, this despite its 
consistency with what appears to be a global subject norm? 
 
Figure 1. Intro. Programming Non Passing Students by 
Country (ex. Watson & Li, 2014) 
To compound matters, predicting success in studying 
computing at tertiary level has long been problematic. For 
instance while Engler (2010) found that “academic 
achievement at school…has the strongest association with 
first-year university performance” (p. 35), he also “found no 
association in performance in information technology studies 
and taking mathematics with calculus at school, after 
controlling for school achievement” (p. 36). So sifting out the 
likely successes then is a challenge and some inevitable level 
of failure in introductory programming can be predicted both 
from our experience and from the international literature.  
As a result of the challenge in producing capable developers, 
shortages of software developers have been noted locally 
(Roberton, CITRENZ June 2014 newsletter) to inhibit the 
growth of software and web based development companies, 
and global shortages have been noted in many other countries 
(Watson & Li, 2014).  
Given that software development skills are in demand because 
they require advanced capability, and that it is always easy to 
pass a student (if short term commercial considerations take 
precedence), does a watered down set of programming 
courses to meet EPIs address these needs? Should the 
institutions that set rigorous and demanding course 
expectations be defunded if some students fail, when these 
successful students are the very ones sought by industry? It is 
well known that the first year has a “sorting and certifying” 
effect (Myers& Rowan, 1986) and in our experience students 
that do succeed and persist past that point tend to 
subsequently do well.  
In that case, what form of assessment should Institutions 
adopt in the face of an EPI driven funding regime. The 
implicit model for EPI’s appears to be “norm referenced” 
(Tan & Prosser, 2004), (i.e. that for a given population of 
students x% should be expected to pass, where x% is well in 
excess of half the student body, and with that performance 
target also expected to progressively increase over time for 
instance cf. below  
The Minister for Tertiary Education, Skills and 
Employment has decided to maintain the upper thresholds 
and increase the lower thresholds for measuring 2014 
performance, which will impact on 2015 funding. This 
reflects the improvement in TEOs’ educational 
performance and the expectation that TEOs will continue 
to improve their performance, particularly those with 
poorer performance. 
(source: http://www.tec.govt.nz/Funding/Policies-and-
processes/Performance-linked-funding/Details-for-TEOs/)  
How does this model fit with an approach built upon a 
“standards based” assessment regime (Barker, 1995), such as 
that in operation at Auckland University of Technology, 
where students are deemed to have passed a course once they 
have demonstrated achievement of the course learning 
outcomes? Does the government want us to end up with a 
society like Lake Woebegon where “everyone is above 
average” (Trusted Advisor, 2012). 
4. . DISCUSSION 
Funding models are powerful drivers of behaviour in 
governmental organisations. So the funding linked EPI model 
has significant potential for steering the education system. 
However there appears to be some tension here between the 
Government’s stated objectives. The New Zealand 
Government desires greater participation in tertiary education 
at higher qualification levels by Maori & Pasifika students, 
greater provision of STEM education and ever improving 
success rates for students. (TEC, 2014) 
However, in the case of the course completion EPIs, does 
achieving an arbitrarily imposed hurdle for passing students at 
the individual course level actually realise those outcomes? 
Without acknowledging that students new to tertiary study 
and taking challenging subjects to which they have had little 
prior exposure, may decide that this is not the course for them, 
these measures become merely arbitrary and punitive 
instruments. Failure which drives a more appropriate student 
degree or subject choice in such a circumstance may indeed 
be a warranted outcome? How many accountants do we need 
who can’t add, doctors who can’t diagnose, lawyers who can’t 
draft a contract, software developers who can’t communicate 
over requirements or produce robustly designed and bug free 
code? 
How does society adequately weigh the best interests of all 
stakeholders - students, educators, employers, educational 
institutions, professional bodies, parents and the wider 
community? Instruments such as EPIs that place 
responsibility on institutions for factors outside their control 
and treat the student as sovereign consumers have serious 
shortcomings. Where do family, financial and social pressures 
not to mention personal responsibility on the part of the 
individual student fit? For instance in the model of student 
persistence in a subject, Fig 2, presented below, there are only 
a few areas in which an institution may productively 
intervene, respectively in academic and social integration.  
So why then is the institution the primary site of the 
performance measurement regime? 
4.1 Dilemmas facing educators 
In the face of these pressures how should educators respond, 
especially as they may often be acting in an institution 
offloading its own imposed burdens on to the individual 
teachers?  
It is a given that the educators applying their professional 
judgement are not expected to lower the standards of the 
learning outcomes of a course, yet they are now being asked 
to pass a higher percentage of students each year. On one 
hand the institution wants to receive the student income to 
stay viable, yet the students really may lack the desire or not 
have a chance of successful course completion. 
 
 
Figure 2. Persistence in Subject – Elements open to Institutional Impact (adapted from Cabera et al 1993) 
 
That leaves the responsibility with the educator who now 
faces pressure from their managers to meet targets that have 
been set to satisfy internal and external factors over which 
they have no control. 
One area of weakness with an EPI driven regime is that there 
appears to be no set criteria for dealing with student 
withdrawals from a course which could significantly change 
the course completion results of a course. If students withdraw 
before the 10% mark of a course are they included in the 
course completion results as a failure in that course? Victoria 
University of Wellington state in their 2013 – 2015 
Investment Plan in discussing low provision: “Most of the 
remainder are courses with initial small enrolments that were 
affected by late withdrawals” (Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2012). 
Students, (such as IT practitioners) who take a course just to 
acquire the knowledge rather than complete the assessments, 
would again alter the course completion results for a course. 
In such cases the educator has little control over the course 
completion results which could very well exceed the required 
performance indicator target, if withdrawals had not been 
counted and everyone sat the assessments, yet for these 
reasons it would be reported as well below the required 
performance indicator. 
4.2 Exemption to the target? 
For courses such as introductory programming where there is 
overwhelming international evidence of pass rates 
significantly lower than those being globally set by 
institutions there needs to be an opportunity to be exempted 
from these targets. However the way the targets are set, as a 
blanket overall target, any course which was not meeting the 
target would be seen to lower the result of an institution and 
would not be looked on favourably and possibly classed 
pejoratively as low performing provision. Taking this further, 
will institutions retain courses with low course completion 
rates even if they are integral to the qualification, and 
especially in an environment where TEC imposes financial 
penalities for such course outcomes? 
4.3 When to teach introductory 
programming 
There is overwhelming evidence to demonstrate that the 
introductory programming course is a “gate-keeper” to 
success in computing/computer science qualifications. (Selby 
et al, 1998). In the regime of attempting to meet arbitrarily set 
course completion targets institutions it would be shrewd to 
not offer introductory programming in the first semester of a 
qualification. However the information technology industry 
advice and our own experience in curriculum development 
indicates that to be a capable software developer it takes six 
semesters of study to cover a sequence of courses progressing 
from ‘programming in the small’, through software design, 
software process and team work experiences, to completing a 
significant piece of software at the ‘programming in the large’ 
level. The dilemma then is that Introductory Programming 
does need to be included early regardless of the course 
completion rates. 
To not only teach the students the joy of programming but 
move closer to meeting these performance indicators, 
strategies that educators could adopt are to look at ways to 
motivate students and intervene when students are struggling. 
This should happen as a matter of good teaching not just to 
meet an arbitrarily set EPI. Academic staff in tertiary 
institutions who value teaching and learning, will always 
strive to improve their teaching and learning regardless of any 
EPI’s that are imposed upon them. Steele (2010) argues that 
as introductory programming is such a difficult subject to 
teach with “varying rates of motivation” that introducing a 
competition is one method of retaining motivation and 
retention. Another approach such as the interviewing 
interventions discussed in Sarkar et (2013) may help to 
encourage students to complete the course and therefore help 
institutions to approach the arbitrarily set target. 
4.4 Possible reactions 
There are a number of possible reactions to these EPI targets 
that have been set. The content of the courses could very 
easily be watered down to be made much simpler than the 
original course. Providing no one is going to check on this, an 
increased successful completion rate would be achievable. 
The question then arises as to the success rate students in 
subsequent courses and the view of the industry stakeholders 
who are employing these graduates. By “watering down” the 
course content and the learning outcomes educators could 
certainly keep managers and funding bodies happy. Students 
might then be able to decide on an institution for their study 
based on these advertised results, yet not be able to perform in 
the workplace. 
The dilemma facing the educators would then be that of 
lowering their standards, and passing students who in their 
professional opinion should not achieve a passing grade. Once 
an institution had a reputation for producing graduates who 
were not capable, even though students were flocking to enrol 
based on the institutions high EPI’s, stakeholders would 
surely shy away from employing those graduates. [An 
anecdotal report to the authors by an industry colleague, 
suggests that employers are currently relegating to the rubbish 
bin applications by graduates from some institutions]. In this 
case the graduate outcomes reputation would be a much better 
measure to guide a student’s choice of institution. 
4.5 Impacts 
The pressure on institutions and particularly educators and 
departments with the introduction of the EPI’s is increasingly 
intensifying. Arbitrarily setting EPI’s and reporting on them 
institutionally may also see some dubious behaviour among 
senior management staff. If an educator reports a ‘below 
target’ course completion result and it is changed by the 
higher levels of institutional management for whatever reason, 
what sort of impact will that have on the credibility and 
integrity of that institution? 
As earlier noted, there are so many factors that contribute to 
success: domestic students vs international students, part-time 
student vs full-time students, school leavers vs mature 
students, distance students vs internal students. The dilemmas 
posed in response to these managerially imposed targets, has a 
corrosive effect which potentially destroys the collegiality and 
professionalism of academic staff.  
Moreover this measurement regime is essentially in violation 
of the education act under which “academic freedom and the 
autonomy of institutions are to be preserved and enhanced”, 
including:  
(d) The freedom of the institution and its staff to teach and 
assess students in the manner they consider best promotes 
learning (Education Act, 1989, s161). 
A normatively based evaluation regime which really only 
reproduces the 80/20 success/failure split of any pareto law at 
the aggregate level really measures nothing.  
To misapply this from of measurement at individual course 
levels by punitively withdrawing funding for failure to meet a 
target set at the aggregate level, is wholly flawed. It has the 
potential to: punish institutions taking risks by trying to 
promote access for students; to weaken standards for 
challenging disciplines such as the STEM subjects; and to 
distort degree curricula by forcing the removal of essential but 
difficult core courses. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The New Zealand Government’s policy settings of an 
educational ‘performance based’ planning, target setting and 
measurement regime are shaping institutional behaviours, 
with local adoption of broad targets to meet externally 
imposed demands and metrics. At a discrete discipline and 
course level these indicators have considerable distortionary 
potential.  
As one example explored here, introductory programming is a 
difficult subject to understand when it is first introduced and 
trying to meet the wider targets set by TEC through the 
institution is counter to the purpose of learning this subject. It 
would be irresponsible to the many stakeholders of computing 
education programmes to pass students who really aren’t 
capable of meeting the learning outcomes of these courses.  
The setting of Educational Performance Indicators without 
regard to the discipline areas or the students involved is ill 
advised and ill judged. One of the published driving factors in 
setting and reporting on these is to furnish students with 
information to choose their institution of study. Publishing 
these as a single result is irresponsible and in no way should 
influence a student’s choice of place to study. There are many 
other factors that should be considered before making such a 
choice. 
Does the TEC truly believe that they are promoting quality by 
asking institutions to set and report on arbitrary EPI’s that are 
really meaningless out of context? We believe in this critique, 
that we have made the case against the misguided and 
damaging performativity underlying this policy. 
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